

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SOVIET PERSONNEL AT ZAVOD 2, KUYBYSHEV

- Many of the older and more experienced of the engineers, particularly that group which did most of the direction of development at Zavod 2, had come from other research and/or development centers.
- Col. OLEKHNOVICH, Major KVASOV, and Capt. SEMENOV had come from either TsIAM (Central Scientific Research Institute of Aircraft Engine Building), which did development work on motors, or VIAM (All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Aviation Materials), which was a techno-physical research institute, and did work on metal alloys, particularly those used in turbine blades.
- Apparently these people from research centers had more effect on production planning and development operations than did personnel directly responsible to the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. They maintained close contact, meanwhile, with their respective home organizations. The only people from the Ministry who visited the plant were Major General MIKOYAN, and another major general

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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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3. This older and more experienced group of engineers from research centers were, by-and-large, well qualified people, and they were not afraid to approach the German engineers for help in the solving of questions on production problems. [] various ones of this group approached Ing. PRESSLER on several occasions. 25X1
4. The training of young engineers was also supervised by this group of engineers. Two different training devices were used to further the knowledge of the younger engineers (who were mostly graduates of Technical High Schools). First, whenever the German groups published a report on any phase of the work that had been done, this report would be circulated to the young engineers. They would study the sections of the reports that came within their own fields of endeavor and would finally have to give a lecture based on such readings and analysis to their colleagues. Second, whenever parts made at the plant turned out to be defective, the young engineers would be given the task of redesigning the part to eliminate the fault. Actually, [] in regard to the first training method the young engineers simply made digests of all the reports that they had read and delivered their lecture from their notes without knowing very much about the material that was in them. Furthermore, [] when given a job of redesigning faulty parts they would simply come to the Germans and obtain their suggestions for eliminating the fault. 25X1
5. Both the older and the younger engineers were very aggressive in carrying out work assignments. This is perhaps more true of the younger group, because each of these men had to show that he could pursue his own project in a determined manner before he could transfer to a better job in another plant. 25X1

QUALITY OF PRODUCTION MATERIALS AT ZAVOD 2

6. When the German engineers first came to Zavod 2 in 1946, they immediately realized that the engine development program could not be carried out with the materials that the Soviets gave them. The Soviets, when informed of this, insisted that the Germans proceed with their work, and use only available materials. The Soviets took the attitude that the Germans were attempting to hold up the program. Until the fall of 1948, the Germans were in constant disagreement on this point. During the work on the Soviet "Nene" engine, however, the plant managers were finally forced to concede that results could not be expected unless the quality of materials was improved. This came about after the research people from VIAM and TsIAM, referred to above, directed a series of criticisms at the plant management. The effect of the criticism on the Soviets was immediate, and the Germans also thereafter came under increasing pressure to establish firmer termination dates on their projects and to otherwise bring their own group under closer administrative control.

GERMAN CONSULTATION WORK IN OTHER PLANTS

7. During the early part of their stay in the USSR the German engineers at Zavod 2 were sometimes called upon to visit production facilities in other parts of the USSR. In particular, [] three engineers of the BMW group made such trips--engineers SIEMANN, SCHENKER, and ZIMMERMANN. All of 25X1

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these made at least one trip to an unidentified factory in Moscow, reputedly employing over 20,000 persons. In addition, ZIMMERMANN made a trip to an unidentified plant in the Urals ("in the direction of Tashkent"). These trips, which ordinarily lasted from two to five weeks, were stopped in the fall of 1947 and Soviet engineers who wished to consult with the Germans at Zavod 2 thereafter had to come to Kuybyshev. [] some of the Junkers engineers went to a plant in Ufa where the 004 engine was being built.

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[] None of the parts for the engines came from those countries.

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TEST STAND INSTRUMENTATION

8. Instruments on the engine test stand were at first entirely of German manufacture. When these instruments deteriorated due to normal wear and tear, they were replaced by Soviet instruments. No particular difficulty was encountered in obtaining replacement instruments, and they functioned as well as the original ones.

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REMOVAL OF GERMAN ENGINEERS FROM THE TURBO-PROP ENGINE PROGRAM

9. [] the basic reasons for the removal of the German personnel from the turbo-prop program, just at the stage when beneficial results were being obtained, were political. [] no rumors or the like which would give any other reason for this withdrawal of the Germans. It should be noted also that 90 per cent of the Germans who were returned in 1950 were those who had the more ordinary jobs--technicians, mechanics, and the like. The remaining people include some of the best of the German development engineers, and they are still in the USSR; [] some of these are doing no development work.

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